This article examines evolving gendered protection narratives surrounding four 'abduction' cases in which Sahrawi refugee girls and young women living in Ultimately, I argue that Sahrawi girls and women have become hypervisible in Spain, being conceptualised as women who 'belong' to the Spanish nation which in turn has a responsibility to 'protect' 'our' Sahrawi women from 'their' culture.
Introduction
Contrary to the earlier invisibility of women in migration studies, migrant and refugee women have become key protagonists in academic debates and policies surrounding the causes, nature and implications of different forms of migration (Indra 1989; Dustin and Phillips 2008) . Multiple challenges posed by feminists to reportedly 'gender-neutral' understandings of 'voluntary' and 'forced' migration have led to the documentation of gendered causes and experiences of migration and displacement (Indra 1999; Mahler and Pessar 2006) , recognising that gender relations and identities influence and are affected by living in refugee camps in the south (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009) , applying for asylum in the north (Bloch et al. 2000) , or attempting to integrate into 'multicultural' host states and asylum states around the world (Matsuoka and Sorensen 1999) . Debates prompted by feminists in the 1980s and 1990s motivated, amongst other things, an exploration of 3 states', international organisations', and civil society's responsibility to 'protect' migrant and minority women from practices defined by Western observers as 'abusive, ' 'illiberal' and 'violent,' focusing on practices including 'forced marriage', 'child marriage' or 'female genital surgeries' (Okin 1998; Cohen et al. 1999; Phillips 2003 Phillips , 2007 .
While campaigns and legislation have been developed to protect minority citizen women and female migrants from such forms of violence in Western states (ibid), legal and policy frameworks have also been developed by states and bodies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to protect refugee women from violence in southern-based refugee camps (UNHCR 1995) , and to recognise these practices and other forms of gender-based persecution as grounds for asylum in the north (i.e. Canadian IRB 1996; UNHCR 2002 UNHCR , 2009 ). Such guidelines and policies institutionalise the international community's responsibility to protect girls and women from what are perceived to be religiously, culturally and politically sanctioned forms of gender-based violence in their places of origin. Indeed, far from the earlier invisibility of migrant women and Western states' "laissez-faire tolerance or indifference" (Phillips and Dustin 2004, 419) , shifts within academia and state policies have led to migrant and refugee women's rights coming to be "at the top of the political agenda" (Roggeband and Verloo 2007, 271) . The need to 'protect' migrant and minority women has thus emerged as "an 'emblematic' policy problem" (272) for Western states active not only within their own territory, but also across the south through development and humanitarian programmes and, in certain instances, even via military interventions.
However, not all migrant or refugee women are perceived to be equally vulnerable or in need of protection; rather, "the category of migrant women is shrinking" in Europe, with concerns about "gender and migrants' rights" increasingly revolving around Muslim migrant women (Roggeband and Verloo 2007, 283) . Indeed, regarding asylum-seeking and refugee women, Akram (2000) and others (incl. have critiqued the development and institutionalisation of neo-Orientalist protection narratives and politico-legal structures which construct Muslim refugee women as eternal victims of what is monolithically portrayed as an intrinsically violent and barbaric religion. Western state and non-state policies ostensibly designed to 'protect' migrant and refugee women in the public and private spheres are thus revealed to be based upon a "discursive strategy that constructs gender subordination as integral only to certain [non-Western] cultures" solidifying a separation and hierarchy between 'us' (liberal, equal) and 'them' (illiberal, barbaric and oppressive of women), for highly political purposes (Volpp 2001 (Volpp , 1181 . By opposing race and religion with gender in such debates, the 'positional superiority' of Western culture is reinforced over Other cultures (Nader 1989 ) as a means of justifying Western intervention to "save brown women from brown men" (Spivak 1993, 93) . Western actors have thus established violence against Muslim migrant women as a central concern, proposing the necessity of 'saving' these women from 'their' 'culture,' and perceiving the West as being responsible for solving this problem across a range of geographies.
With these debates and criticisms in mind, this article examines Spanish civil society and institutional responses to the 'abductions' of four Sahrawi refugee girls and women for whom state responsibility is both unclear and highly politicised. After a brief 5 overview of the Sahrawi refugee situation, the article examines two sets of case-studies involving Sahrawi girls and young women who left their Algerian-based refugee camps as young teenagers to live and study in Spain. By exploring Spanish state and civil society responses to these girls' 'abductions' by their birth-families and their forced return to the Sahrawi camps, I argue that there has been a major shift in the ways in which legitimate responsibility and authority over Sahrawi refugee women as Muslim This article analyses the content, discursive frames and aims of high-profile 'liberation' campaigns mobilised in Spain as a response to these four 'abductions'. These campaigns were selected due to their highly public and politicised nature, and the article therefore examines publically available sources produced and distributed in Spain over the course of over a decade.
1 The analysis of these sources draws on insights derived from three fieldwork visits to the Saharawi refugee camps (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , and extensive research conducted with and about Sahrawi adults and children in Algeria, Cuba, Libya, South Africa, Spain and Syria (2001-present) , including over 100 interviews with Sahrawi refugees, and more than 40 interviews with Spanish humanitarians (FiddianQasmiyeh 2009 (FiddianQasmiyeh , 2010 (FiddianQasmiyeh , 2011 Following Franco's death, the armed conflict between Morocco, Mauritania and Polisario intensified, with a mass Sahrawi exodus being displaced to other parts of the territory, and later, following the bombardment of these first encampments (Mercer 1979) , to the 8 nascent Algerian-based refugee camps near these countries' common border (for a detailed history, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009 (HRW 2008, 9) . Despite being on Algerian territory, the Algerian government has effectively "ceded de facto administration" to Polisario/SADR (ibid), enabling them to "manage their own civil society and social systems without interference" (WFP 2009 (WFP -2010 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011) . Such high levels of selfmanagement and Polisario's de facto control over the Algerian territory upon which the camps have been built, distinguish the Sahrawi camps from the majority of refugee camp contexts around the world.
Polisario/SADR's camp-based administrative and institutional capacities have been widely commended by international observers, with the camps denominated "the best run refugee camps in the world" and "models of efficient local government" (Brazier 1997, 14) . Indeed, in her seminal work, Imposing Aid (1986), Harrell-Bond labelled the Sahrawi camps a 'success story' amidst a failing system which creates 'dependency syndrome' amongst refugees (also Voutira and Harrell-Bond 2000, 66) . Importantly, a range of intersecting claims have been projected internationally to demonstrate the 'ideal' nature of Polisario/SADR and 'its' camps, including in a 1986 report written following an
Oxfam desk-officer's visit to the camps:
Perhaps the most impressive thing about Sahrawi society is that it is the most fundamentally balanced society I have ever come across in terms of the relationships between men and women (Mowles 1986, 9).
As I have argued elsewhere, gender equality and women's 'empowerment' have become central and recurrent features in both Polisario/SADR and Western accounts of life in the Sahrawi camps (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009 , 2011 . Mainstream academic and civil society claims regarding the 'ideal' nature of the camps demonstrate that while Polisario/SADR has constructed and developed the camps internally, this 'liberation movement' has concurrently obtained the approval of key actors in the international arena by adhering to "the trinity of democratisation, good governance and women's rights" (Kandiyoti 2004, 134 (OHCHR 2006, 11) . Specifically, OHCHR notes that although Algeria "holds that it bears no responsibility with regard to the human rights situation of the Sahrawi people" (since Algeria recognises SADR's jurisdiction and, in effect sovereignty, over the camps), "no international human rights treaty body has specifically validated this view with regard to the international human rights obligations accepted by Algeria" (13).
In OHCHR's view, "Algeria should take all relevant measures to ensure that all individuals present on its territory benefit from the protection of the international human rights conventions to which it is a party" (13). Simultaneously, however, Human Rights Watch (HRW) argues that "although Algeria remains ultimately responsible ... Polisario needs to be accountable for how it treats the people under its administration" (HRW 2008, 9 ).
An anomalous situation thereby exists whereby Polisario/SADR is simultaneously recognised as a state by some members of the international community, presents itself as a state which is obliged to adhere to central tenets of international human rights law and specific obligations to protect women and children, and yet is also classified as a nonstate actor by the UN and other actors who argue that "it has no international obligations under international human rights treaties" (OHCHR 2006, 13) and therefore cannot formally be held accountable to the Charters which it has signed 'as a state'. This case is therefore not only relevant to on-going debates surrounding the responsibilities of nonstate actors in armed conflict around the world, but also raises specific questions surrounding the responsibilities of state, quasi-state, and non-state actors to 'protect' Sahrawi refugees living under the 'jurisdiction' of SADR. In the context of this article, precisely which actors consider themselves or are considered by others to be responsible to protect specific refugees -male or female, adult or child -becomes an even more pertinent issue.
Spain and Polisario
In many Indeed, it is particularly noteworthy that no parallel high-profile cases involving boys or young men have emerged in the Spanish media, despite a number of Sahrawi boys/young men having been asked to return to the camps following short-and long-term fostering in Spain (interviews, 27 February Camp, April-May 2007) . Given the lack of reliable information regarding the number or gender of Sahrawi children who are fostered in Spain, or the gender of those who are asked to return to the camps, it is difficult to identify precisely how fostering and 'returns' to the camps are gendered in nature.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the absence of Spanish media, legal and political campaigns relating to the return of boys and young men to the camps highlights the extent to which the 'abduction' of Sahrawi girls and young women has attracted the Spanish public's imagination and media coverage, in turn suggesting a particularly strong sense of responsibility towards the protection of Sahrawi girls and young women by virtue of their gender, age and nationality.
Introducing the early cases
Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu lived and studied in León, La Rioja and Asturias for seven, four and three years respectively before becoming the centre of a chain of Spanish media campaigns between 2001 and 2003 (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2006 , 2010a . Aicha moved to Spain aged 12 to complete her secondary and tertiary education, while Huria and Fatimetu were fostered aged 11 and 12 respectively primarily for medical reasons:
Huria due to serious dental complications, and Fatimetu because of her condition as a celiac (Fernández 2003) . Despite the above-mentioned fostering contracts, Aicha returned only once in seven years to visit her family in the refugee camps, while Huria had not seen her biological parents for over 2 years (Díaz 2003) . These experiences clearly reinforced their families' anxieties that they might eventually lose their daughters entirely. Shortly after the girls reached puberty, their parents separately asked them to return to the camps to help care for their mothers: Aicha's mother was enduring a highrisk pregnancy; another girl's mother had suffered a miscarriage, while the third had just recently given birth (Castaño-Boullón 2003; Guijarro 2003 (Cazón 2004, 187) . Throughout these and other cases, Sahrawi refugees and events taking place in the Algerian-based Sahrawi refugee camps were categorised as 'domestic' and 'national' issues in the Spanish media, rather than an 'international one', indicating the extent to which the Sahrawi camps were perceived to be an extension of the Spanish national self.
Alongside general claims that Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu's rights to health and education were denied in the camps, the Spanish families and the girls themselves Simultaneously, Huria's personal (and political) identification in the extract above demonstrates a rejection of the Sahrawi 'way of life,' speaking of, and thus Othering, her birth-parents and refugee community as 'them' and 'they', whilst aligning herself with her Spanish family's culture and civil norms (her imagined 'we' and 'us'). In this sense, Huria's physical separation from her birth parents while she was fostered in Spain can be perceived as resulting in a realignment of her sense of forming part of the Spanish Selfto paraphrase de Beauvoir, although Huria may have been 'born' a Sahrawi girl, through the 'modernising' fostering experience she has 'become' a Spanish woman (also Nash 2005).
These images were paralleled and expanded upon by those members of the Spanish media who supported the teenaged refugees' 'release,' basing their reports on the specific details delineated in the young women's letters and the Spanish families' press releases, but concurrently drawing upon their own perceptions and beliefs surrounding In all of these statements, Sahrawi society as a whole and Sahrawi parents more specifically are "constructed as timelessly misogynistic, barbaric and uncivilized," The intersecting depictions arising in the case of Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu's abductions therefore led to many members of Spanish civil society advocating for the girls' 'liberation' from their oppressive birth parents and culture in the refugee camps, thereby directly engaging in "an Orientalist logic that paternalistically seeks to protect women" (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 775) . Importantly, such gendered protection scenarios are dependent on both a "polarization between 'us' and 'them,' but also [upon] caricatures and stereotypes which bear little resemblance to reality" (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 771 ; also Abu-Lughod 2002).
Invoking Polisario's powers to protect
In In relation to Fatimetu's retention in the camps despite her serious medical condition, the Riojan solidarity NGO indicates that:
Considering these events, and their seriousness, we find it incredible that the Polisario As these quotes indicate, whilst Polisario/SADR is a 'government-in-exile' and is wholly dependent on externally provided humanitarian aid, Aicha, the Spanish families and solidarity NGOs all asserted that Polisario was the organisation which should be approached to obtain the girls' release in line with international human rights standards.
In this sense, Spanish families invoked their 'intimate' 'parental' concern over the girls'
wellbeing to demand not only Spanish but also Sahrawi 'state' intervention in Sahrawi family life, summoning the state's 'legitimate' power over Sahrawi refugee girls and women based in private households in the Sahrawi refugee camps.
However, while Spanish families, civil society and politico-legal actors argued that Polisario/SADR should enact its state-like authority to protect these young women, Mimouna's case, it was her Spanish fiancé who reported her disappearance to the local court in Lucena, claiming that she had been kidnapped by her mother and siblings; had 28 been forcibly taken from Spain to the Algerian port of Oran (reportedly at knife point);
and was being retained against her will in the camps (Planelles 2009 Indeed, this case confirms the extent to which the broader Spanish-Sahrawi humanitarian and political support system is grounded upon gender-based conditionalities, demanding the intervention of state and non-state actors within and outside of Sahrawi households in the camps and in Spain alike (also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009 , 2010a Press 2009a) . In the meantime, the Spanish judge confiscated Mimouna's father's and brother's passports to prevent them from leaving the country, as they had remained in Spain while Mimouna was reportedly taken to the camps by her mother and other brothers (also M.P. 2008b). Limiting these two male relatives' mobility, and enforcing their presence within the Spanish national territory, was thus perceived as a key means to achieve Mimouna's freedom of movement in/from the camps and to secure her safe return to her legitimate home, Spain.
Spain's intervention is, legally speaking, understandable since the 'crimes' of 'abduction' took place on Spanish territory, and Spain therefore has clear jurisdiction over these cases. Furthermore, the abovementioned Spanish requests for Algeria's interventions are broadly in line with the arguments presented by HRW and OHCHR, as quoted above. HRW has also argued that:
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The government of the host country, Algeria-which is accountable under international law for protecting the rights of all persons within its territory-has ceded de facto administration of the camps to a liberation movement that is not formally accountable in the international system for its human rights practices.
However, despite this international obligation OHCHR (para. 39) notes that: in Spain, the degree of public attention and anxiety expressed over the need to 'protect' these Sahrawi girls and women from their families is particularly notable, reflecting the extent to which gender, age and religion intersect in the identification of which migrant bodies warrant, and indeed deserve, state protection across different geopolitical contexts.
In the cases briefly explored above, it can be argued that relations of intimacy, belonging and responsibility to protect have been realigned to favour Spanish families (Aicha, Huria and Fatimetu's foster-parents on the one hand, and Mimouna's Spanish fiancé on the other) to the detriment of Sahrawi families. The young women's physical, emotional and discursive separation from their biological families has been paralleled by the delegitimisation of the Sahrawi birth-families' ties to their daughters and sisters, and the public naturalisation of the Spanish families' concern for and public interventions to 'save' these young women from their 'ignorant' and 'egotistic' parents (op cit). In line with broader literatures which recognise that "the intimate is a coproduction with the public" (Oswin and Olund 2010, 60) , the intimate ties between the young women, their Spanish families, and Spanish society more broadly have been publically reinforced, solidified and legitimated through these campaigns, which have in turn demanded both Spanish and Sahrawi interventions in Sahrawi intimate relations and intimate spheres.
In the cases explored above, a wide network of families, members of Spanish civil society and NGO workers, alongside Spanish officials including lawyers, judges and ministers, have declared themselves responsible for the 'protection' of female Sahrawi refugee 'abductees' outside of Spanish national territory. However, Spain's determination and ability to 'rescue' these women from their families in the Sahrawi camps has been greatly complicated in these cases by virtue of long-standing struggles over political and discursive control over the Sahrawi camps and their inhabitants. Since Polisario explicitly claims to represent and act as a 'state' towards its 'refugee-citizens', whilst both Algeria (the host-state) and Polisario have denied legal responsibility over 'abductees' such as Aicha, Fatimetu, Huria and Mimouna, the question of 'sovereignty' and legal responsibility over the inhabitants of the Sahrawi refugee camps is actively accentuated by such cases. With both Polisario and the Algerian government refusing to address these 'abductions,' Spanish assumptions regarding the necessity and justifiability of 'outside intervention' to 'protect' oppressed women are reinforced. As such, the Sahrawi refugee camps are increasingly viewed by Spain as "spaces in which [they, i.e. the Spanish authorities] are entitled to exercise a form of sovereignty." 6 Indeed, it could be argued that Spanish interventions to monitor and influence intimate family/household relations are an effective means of controlling camp spaces which lie beyond Spain's national jurisdiction. In this sense, the intimate aid system which underpins the camps' material and political survival is characterised not only by intimate ties of dependency between families, but provide the foundations for diverse forms of intimate governmentality of Sahrawi family life and private spheres by Sahrawi and Spanish authorities alike.
Ironically, while the Sahrawi refugee camps have systematically been heralded as the "best run refugee camps in the world" (op cit) and as models of self-sufficiency characterised by democracy and gender equality, such cases threaten to reinforce outsiders' sense of the necessity and justifiability of their involvement and exertion of their power over the camps and their inhabitants. Equally, they solidify the more specific preference held by donor states that refugee camps should be administered by donor experts (Harrell-Bond 1986) , and broader assumptions held by the international community regarding the necessity of 'outside experts' intervening to resolve refugee crises and to 'protect' refugee women across the south and the north alike.
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